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1 Introduction
Recent reforms in many countries have sought to increase the role of consumer choice in public
services such as education and health care. At a time when government finances are severely
constrained, choice is viewed as a mechanism for driving competition between providers and
thereby, in a system with fixed prices, delivering improvements in quality and efficiency.
One type of reform employed to promote choice has been to increase the options available
to consumers by allowing entry from private sector or not-for-profit providers [Besley and
Ghatak, 2003, Blo¨chliger, 2008, Hoxby, 2003]. Examples include Charter schools in the US
and Sweden [Asth et al., 2013, Bo¨hlmark and Lindahl, 2015, Ladd, 2002] and the recent free
school programme in England1; and publicly funded health care systems, like the English
National Health Service (NHS) studied in this paper2.
Policies to increase choice have proved controversial, however, because of concerns that
not all consumers are equally able to exercise choice. Unequal engagement in choice may
prove problematic in a publicly funded system when some types of providers deliver higher
quality of service and only benefit those who get to choose them. And it may defeat the
objective of enhancing competitive constraints, to the extent that it insulates providers from
competitive pressure that is otherwise induced by the threat of their users switching to
competitors.
This paper examines how patients sort across hospitals following reforms to the NHS
in England, which increased choice by allowing privately-owned hospitals, or Independent
Sector Providers (ISPs), to enter the market for publicly funded health care. Private
providers have shorter waiting times, higher patient satisfaction and arguably higher clinical
quality3. We address two primary research questions. First, are certain types of patients less
likely to choose a privately owned hospital? Second, are there frictions that diminish the
access of certain patient groups to the new providers and the potential competitive pressure
that private providers could exert on public providers for them to improve their performance?
Specifically, we ask whether sorting is driven by differences in patient need or variation in
local hospital provision, or influenced by frictions in the market, such as the referral practices
of general practitioners (GPs, primary care doctors).
We estimate a mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) model of hospital choice, where patients
are able to choose from a set of both, public NHS and privately owned hospitals. The model
1See, for example, the introduction of education vouchers and charter schools in the US and Sweden, and
? for discussion of the introduction of private providers in England.
2In the US system, except for the elderly and those on social benefits, provision is provided by private
managed care organizations, comprising health insurance and health care delivery. In that system, the
“public option”, blocked by Congress in 2010, was intended as a constraint on the private market place.
3See, for example, [NHS Partners Network, 2015].
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is estimated using NHS administrative records data on elective hip replacement procedures
for the year 2012/13. Hip replacements are well suited to address our question, as the
procedure is conducted in large volumes and ISPs have gained a substantial presence in the
market, treating 20% of patients and accounting for 38% of hospitals that treated publicly
funded patients in 2012/13.
We begin by providing descriptive evidence on the sorting present in our sample. We
show that patients who choose ISPs are richer, healthier, and less likely to belong to an ethnic
minority than public hospital patients4. It is these patterns that we seek to understand using
the model.
We then estimate mixed logit models of hospital choice using different assumptions on
the composition of choice sets that patients get to consider when making their choice.
The first and more standard approach allows patients to choose between their nearest
10 hospitals, which we term the “distance choice set”. Consistent with the findings in the
hospital choice literature [Beckert et al., 2012, Capps et al., 2003, Gaynor et al., 2016, Ho,
2006], the model estimates show that distance, waiting times and quality emerge as significant
determinants of choice. The observable patterns of heterogeneity present in our descriptive
evidence remain, with poorer, less healthy and ethnic minority patients less likely to choose
an ISP. Controlling for local access and patient health, our estimates suggest that patients in
the most deprived areas are up to 25 per cent less likely to choose ISPs than those from the
least deprived areas. Our parameter estimates also highlight the strong influence of the prior
referral patterns of the patient’s GP on patient choice. Patients registered with GPs with
more concentrated patterns of prior referrals are less likely to choose an ISP, more sensitive
to distance, and less sensitive to quality. Alongside the observable heterogeneity, we also
identify significant unobserved heterogeneity across patients with regard to their sensitivity
to distance and their preferences for ISPs, relative to NHS hospitals. Perhaps surprisingly,
however, there does not appear to be any significant unobserved heterogeneity in terms of
valuation of hospital quality attributes.
We also explore a second approach where we redefine patient choice sets based on the
prior referrals of their GP’s. Restricting the choice set in this way both reflects the role the
GP plays as a gatekeeper to secondary care within the NHS system, and the finding in the
standard model that GP referrals have an important affect on hospitals that patients choose.
The “GP choice sets” we construct using referral data exhibit a large variation in the number
and composition of included hospitals. We provide evidence that this choice set formation
is in part governed by market frictions, such as administrative boundaries and ISP contract
4This is consistent with existing descriptive evidence from the first ISPs that opened in the mid 2000s
[Bardsley and Dixon, 2011, Chard et al., 2011]
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types, with hospital quality and GP patient characteristics playing only a very limited role.
Our qualitative findings from the estimated model are the same with regard to drivers of
patient choice. Conditional on GP choice sets, sorting by patient income is eliminated and
sorting by ethnic minority status is reduced. There are no changes in sorting with respect
to underlying health. Comparing these findings with those of the standard ‘distance choice
set’ specification, leads us to conclude that the sorting effects are strongly influenced by the
choice set that GPs are likely to present to their patients.
Finally, we use our estimates from the model based on GP choice sets to simulate
counterfactual choices under two scenarios: (patient focussed) patients are re-assigned to
local GPs that are prone to including ISPs; and (GP focussed) patients’ current GPs are
forced to include the same number of ISPs as the most inclusive local GP. Our simulations
show that up to half of the difference in ISP use - and hence of the forgone welfare gains,
e.g. with regard to waiting time - by local deprivation and ethnicity could be eliminated
in the GP focussed scenario; the effect under the patient focussed scenario is only slightly
more muted. These results are important for policy makers: While the GP focussed scenario
is predicted to be more effective, it may be less easy to implement, given the constraints
GPs operate under5; and therefore the second-best, patient focussed strategy may be an
attractive, more feasible alternative policy option.
Our work contributes to several existing literatures. First, we add to the hospital choice
literature [Beckert et al., 2012, Capps et al., 2003, Gaynor et al., 2012, Ho, 2006, Kessler and
McClellan, 2000]. We build on the existing literature in two respects. First, our focus is on
how patients sort across hospitals, and on the distribution of welfare changes, rather than
on aggregate changes. Second, we incorporate the introduction of private providers, which
are not included in other models of hospital choice in England [Gaynor et al., 2016]6.
Our results provide two important insights relevant to this literature. First, differences
in the use of ISP by ethnic minorities and income are only partially explained by patient
health and the characteristics of local hospitals. Such sorting indicates that responses to
reforms or changes in market structure may have heterogeneous impacts upon patients, on
welfare and on competition. Second, there are restrictions on choice that arise from frictions
in the market and therefore distort consumer welfare and limit competition7.
5For example, The Telegraph, 27 October 2016; the article quotes physicians’ concerns about the extra
time cost per patient required by discussing their choice options in more detail.
6Gaynor et al. [2016] consider CABG surgery and this is not a market where ISPs operate.
7While our study focusses on the choices made by patients, given the institutional, socio-demographic
and choice protocol setting they find themselves in, we note that an emerging literature is concerned with
structurally modelling choice protocols in which choice sets are restricted or heterogeneous, often in ways
that are only partially observed by the econometrician. In the area of choices in health care, see for example
Beckert [2015] and Gaynor et al. [2016].
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In many countries with publicly funded health systems, the existence and source of
inequalities in access to health services, are an subject of public and political concern. For
example, in England, the NHS and supporting bodies have statutory duties to address
inequalities in health under the Health and Social Care Act (2012). Understanding the
mechanisms that drive inequalities is therefore vital for policy design. This includes strategies
for the implementation of competition policy, to the extent that unequal engagement in choice
induces impediments to switching and thereby shields providers from competitive pressure,
resulting in diminished incentives to improve quality, efficiency and value for money.
Beyond healthcare, we contribute to the literature that considers the relationship between
choice and sorting in other services, such as school choice [Altonji et al., 2015, Bo¨hlmark
et al., 2016, Burgess et al., 2015, Edmark et al., 2014, Hastings and Weinstein, 2008, Hastings
et al., 2010, Urquiola, 2005]. As in health care, reforms to increase school choice have
included offering parents more formal choice, providing information on school quality to aid
choice [Hastings and Weinstein, 2008], and introducing charter schools and school vouchers
in countries such as the US, Norway and Sweden [Ladd, 2002]. The choice of school does
differ from the choice of hospital in a number of respects, including the period covered by
choice - years for schooling verses a limited course of treatments at a hospital. However, our
results do show that inequalities in use of new providers does exist even when controlling
for the characteristics of consumers and providers, and that information frictions and the
choices consumers are presented with may explain some of the observed patterns of consumer
choices.
Finally, we add to the extensive literature on socioeconomic inequalities in health care
utilisation. In general, this literature finds pro-poor inequalities in the use of primary
care and community health services and pro-rich inequalities in the use of hospital care
[Cookson et al., 2012, Doorslaer et al., 2004, Morris et al., 2005, O’Donnell and Propper,
1991]. However, the extent and the direction of these inequalities typically vary by country,
year and condition and are hard to generalize8. The literature on variation in the quality
and types of care received by different types of patients is smaller, but typically shows that
treatment is on average less intensive and of a lower quality for disadvantaged socioeconomic
and racial minority groups [Fiscella et al., 2000, Moscelli et al., 2015].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on the
NHS and the relevant policy reforms. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 outlines the
model and empirical strategy. And Section 5 presents the results and a discussion of their
8For example, Cookson et al. [2012] find no change in the inequality in the provision of hip replacements
between 2001 and 2008 in England, but Kelly and Stoye [2016] find uneven growth in the number of hip
replacements by local area deprivation from 2002 to 2011, largely explained by changes between 2008 and
2011.
5
robustness. Section 6 provides counterfactual simulations. And Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 NHS Policy Reforms and Patient Choice
The majority of health care in England is provided through the taxpayer funded National
Health Service (NHS), free at the point of use. In this paper, we study the market for NHS
funded elective secondary care.
On the demand side, patients access secondary care via a referral from their primary
care doctor or General Practitioner (GP), and hospital consultants then decide whether the
patient requires surgery. GPs act as “gatekeepers” to hospital-based or secondary care. They
decide whether patients require further treatments and make referrals to a specific hospital.
GPs therefore act both as agents for their patients while also helping to control demand for
elective hospital care. Since the “patient choice” reforms of 2006 and 2008, GPs have been
required to offer patients a choice of hospital when making a referral9. GPs may influence
where patients are treated either by pre-selecting the options that are presented to patients
to choose from, or by directly providing advice. The role of GPs in determining how patients
sort across hospitals is returned to in more detail in Sections 3 and 4.
On the supply side, NHS funded hospital care has historically been delivered by state
owned and run NHS Acute Trusts, or hospitals10. This paper focuses on a set of reforms
introduced alongside the patient choice reforms that further extended choice by increasing the
number of providers or hospitals available to NHS funded patients. The NHS had purchased
small volumes of care from private sector on an ad hoc basis for many years, but two waves
of reforms introduced between 2003 and 2008 formalized and greatly increased the access of
private providers to markets for NHS funded care.11
During the period we study, both GPs and hospitals received NHS payments through
152 “Primary Care Trusts” (PCTs). These PCTs were publicly funded bodies who had
the responsibility of paying for the healthcare of all patients living within their designated
geographic area 12. Payments to GPs are based on a capitation fee, plus a payment for
9These reforms were motivated by both, the belief that patients valued the choice over their care, and
evidence that health care competition when prices were fixed could improve quality [Gaynor, 2006]. A series
of work has found that this reform led to improvements in quality [Cooper et al., 2011, Gaynor et al., 2012].
10A NHS Acute Trust may be comprised of a single hospital or multiple hospitals within the same
geographic area.
11For hip replacements there also exists a small private pay sector, which accounted for a fifth of hip
replacements in 2002 [Arora et al., 2013]; it is excluded from all analyses in this paper.
12These organisations were established in 2002 to deliver a purchaser-provider split necessary to sustain a
market for healthcare.
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performance supplement. The payments received by GPs are not dependent on referrals.
Hospitals receive payments based on activity, on a per patient per treatment basis at rates
which were fixed at a national level.13.
The ISPs reforms that form the context for this study were introduced in several stages,
and track changing priorities of NHS reforms over the 2000s. Understanding the motivation
behind these reforms and the contracts offered to providers is important for understanding
the incentives GPs have to promote ISPs and the profile of patients that ISPs treat.
The reforms introduced three types of ISPs across two waves. The characteristics of each
are summarized in Table 1. The first wave of the reforms introduced Wave 1 Independent
Sector Treatment Centres (ISTCs). These ISTCs began to open in 2003, and were privately
owned providers under contract to provide diagnostic tests and elective procedures only to
NHS patients. The contracts were awarded to help address local capacity constraints and
meet waiting time targets. ISTCs were typically newly created health care facilities, often
located on existing private or NHS hospital sites. The intention was that ISTCs would
treat routine patients, allowing NHS trusts to focus on emergencies and patients with more
complex needs. As expected, this meant patients treated by ISTCs were on average younger
and richer than those treated by NHS providers [Bardsley and Dixon, 2011, Chard et al.,
2011]. These ISTCs were contracted for a certain number of procedures to the NHS, and
providers were paid irrespective of whether the procedures were carried out. PCTs therefore
had an incentive to encourage GPs to refer to these providers. The last of these contracts
expired in 2011, after which payment reverted to the same per patient payments as NHS
hospitals.
A second wave of reforms was launched in 2006, with objectives expanding to include
increasing competition for NHS providers and fostering innovation [Naylor and Gregory,
2009], reflecting the shift in policy focus towards using choice to drive increases in competition
and quality. During this second wave, there were some additional Wave 2 ISTCs, but most
new ISPs were existing private hospitals, which treated NHS and private patients alongside
each other. Both Wave 2 ISTCs and private hospitals were paid on a per procedure basis
similar to the payments for NHS providers 14. As with Wave 1 ISTCs, there were restrictions
on who was able to use ISPs based on underlying health. However, as most ISPs in the second
wave were existing private hospitals, most were located in richer areas than NHS hospital
13So called “Payment by Results” was phased in after 2005/06. Hospital care is grouped into Healthcare
Resource Groups (HRGs), which are similar to Diagnostic Resource Groups in the US. Prices or Tariffs are
then set at a national level based on the average cost of providing the associated care.
14Wave 2 ISTCs were not guaranteed the full contracted value, as in Wave 1 (they were not paid for
procedures that did not take place) but were guaranteed a payment to cover their fixed costs [Naylor and
Gregory, 2009]
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or ISTCs, and therefore served populations that are relatively advantaged. For GPs, the
incentives to refer to the second wave of ISPs were much weaker, as ISPs only received
payments for procedures that took place.
Figure 1 shows how ISPs spread across England between 2006/7 and 2012/13. In 2006/7
there were just 9 ISPs conducting at least 20 NHS funded procedures. By 2012/12 this had
risen to over 119, spread from Newcastle in the North East to Cornwall in the South West.
The number of NHS hospitals remained roughly stable at 200 throughout the period. The
reforms therefore increased the hospitals available to patients by more than half, and by
2012/13 a fifth of NHS funded hip replacements were conducted by ISPs.
2.2 Mechanisms of Patient Sorting by Provider Type
The structure of the reforms points towards three mechanisms that might generate differences
in the characteristics of patients by provider type. First, differences in health based on the
eligibility requirements for ISPs. In particular, ISPs do not treat patients with complex
health conditions who are at risk of requiring emergency intensive care. Some differences in
ISP use by underlying health are therefore to be expected, and the outcome of government
regulations rather than ‘cherry picking’ by ISPs15. This will generate sorting by ill-health
and any other characteristics correlated with ill-health, such as poverty or old age. However,
this sorting may well be appropriate and represent an efficient allocation of resources across
hospitals.
Second, the geographic distribution of ISPs is non-random and is likely to result in
differential access to ISPs. In particular, during the second wave of the reforms, most new
ISPs were existing private hospitals. These were typically located in richer areas, close to
the private-pay patients they serve. Again, given that patients always show a preference for
shorter distances any resulting sorting may be efficient, taking the geographic distribution of
ISPs as given. Whether the geographic distribution is itself efficient is a separate question.
Finally, there may be frictions in advice given by GPs to patients for reasons unrelated
to patient health. As ISPs were new and introduced very quickly, it is likely that GPs may
lack information about the additional providers, at least in the short run. The structure
of the first wave of ISTC contracts also provided an incentive for PCTs to encourage GPs
to refer to ISTCs, to avoid paying for procedures that did not take place. These types of
frictions are at least potentially inefficient, both in terms of restricting access of patients to
ISPs and limiting competition between providers. We will return to the issue of the options
presented to patients in Section 4.2.
15Whether ISPs then imposed additional eligibility requirements that did amount to ‘cherry picking’ or
‘cream skimming’ remains open to debate.
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In addition to concerns about potential welfare losses resulting from market frictions,
there are at least two further reasons why policy makers may be concerned about the sorting
of patients across providers.
First, even if ISP use were based on complete information and absent administrative
constraints, policy makers may be concerned if choice leads to too much segmentation, or
indeed segregation, in public service utilization, given it is paid for by, and designed to serve,
all. Moreover, this segmentation may limit the extent of competition between NHS hospitals
and ISP, reducing the pressure on NHS hospitals to improve quality.
Second, the characteristics of patients carry implications for hospital costs. NHS hospitals
and ISPs are paid on a per patient basis. These payments are based on a clinical grouping
system. They are set nationally and vary very little across providers16. For elective hip
replacements, there is a slightly higher rate of payment if patients have comorbidities or
suffer from more complex health issues, but for the most part there is a flat fee paid17.
However, the costs of treating patients are likely to vary more continuously with underlying
health. Low cost patients moving from NHS hospitals to ISPs may be regarded as an adverse
selection issue. It entails external effects, to the extent that it reduces the ability of NHS
hospitals to cross-subsidize: average costs for NHS hospitals would rise, whereas ISPs would
receive a surplus.
All these concerns depend upon the extent and type of sorting that takes places. Existing
evidence from the first wave of ISTCs points towards ISPs treating younger, healthier
patients. The next section details our data and describes the patterns of sorting in 2012/13,
when almost all ISPs had been introduced.
3 Data
We use data on NHS-funded elective hip replacements. The data come from the NHS
inpatient Hospital Episode Statistics (HES). They provide an administrative record of all
NHS-funded inpatient treatments in England, including treatments provided by both NHS
hospitals and ISPs. Each patient record contains information on where the patients were
admitted, the dates of admission and discharge, up to 20 ICD-10 diagnoses, and information
on any procedures that took place. For each patient record, HES data also identify the
referring GP practice, albeit not the individual GP. We extract hip replacements using the
16These are known as Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) in the US and Healthcare Resource Groups
(HRGs) in England. Small adjustments are made to the payments received, based on length of stay and
local costs of living.
17In our sample, 75% of patients fall under HRG HB12C “Major Hip Procedures for non Trauma Category
1 without CC”.
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relevant orthopaedic procedure codes, and obtain a sample of 68,769 patients.18
3.1 Patient Characteristics
In the MMNL models we estimate, heterogeneity in patients’ preferences is captured by
interactions of hospital attributes with patient characteristics. Table 3 summarizes patient
characteristics used for estimation by hospital type chosen, grouped into three categories: pa-
tient demographics and health; local area characteristics; and characteristics of the patients’
GP practice.
The first panel shows mean demographic and health characteristics by chosen provider
type. The average age of patients treated by both NHS hospitals and ISPs is 68. The share
of ethnic minority patients, which has not been examined by existing studies, is much lower
in ISPs (1.3%) than for NHS patients (3.9%)19. This is consistent with a report on Patient
Choice from 2010, where GPs voiced concerns that language barriers may limit the ability
of minority ethnic populations from exercising choice [Dixon et al., 2010a].
Two sets of measures are used to capture underlying health of the patient. First, we
consider the Charlson Index of comorbidities20 We group patients into three categories: no
comorbidities; a score of 1, which we term mild comorbidities; and a score of more than one,
which we class as severe comorbidities.
Second, we extract all prior admissions for patients in our estimation sample, and create
indicators for whether the patient had at least one (NHS funded) elective or emergency
admission in the three years (1095 days) prior to the hip replacement admission, for any
cause. All our measures confirm that ISP patients are on average less complex and have
better underlying health than NHS patients21. It is however important to note that the
18Hip replacements include those operations with Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS)
Classification of Interventions and Procedures Codes (4th Edition) beginning W37, W38, W39, W93, W94
and W95. Each operation code defines a different type of hip replacement. For a full list of OPCS codes see
here: http://www.surginet.org.uk/informatics/opcs.php.
19These shares are much lower than the share of people of an ethnic minority patients in the population,
due to the age structure of the ethnic minority population in England
20This is calculated using It is calculated using the comorbidities recorded at the point of the hip
replacement admission. The Charlson Index predicts ten-year mortality using 22 comorbidity conditions.
Each condition is scored a 1, 2, 3 or 6, depending on the severity of the condition, and is calculated on the
basis of all diagnoses recorded in hip replacement admission. See Sundararajan et al. [2004] for more details
on the Charlson Index.
21Comparing these measures with the reported underlying health recorded for the 60% of the sample that
responded the Patient Recorded Outcome Measures survey illustrates that the health measures we use pick
up different elements of ill health. Of those that report ever having cancer in PROMs, 79% have had an
elective admission to hospital over the previous 3 years, compared to 53% for all other patients, emergency
admissions were 10 percentage points higher (29% verses 19%), and cancer patients were twice as likely to
have a Charlson index score of 2 or more (15% verses 7%). By contrast, for those reporting high blood
pressure, the shares with prior emergency and elective admissions are both only 2 percentage points higher
10
market is not completely segmented by underlying health: a substantial fraction of ISP
patients do have comorbidities or prior admissions.22.
HES data do not contain any patient level socioeconomic information, but we are able
to embed characteristics at the neighborhood level via the patient’s postcode district and
LSOA.23 Socioeconomic status is measured using the neighborhood level Index of Multiple
Deprivation (IMD) as compiled by the Office for National Statistics.24 This measure allows
us to rank neighborhoods from the least to the most deprived. We rescale the IMD to lie
between zero and one. Higher values imply higher deprivation. Henceforth, we will refer to
this IMD measure as ‘deprivation’. As documented by Chard et al. [2011] and elsewhere,
ISP patients are on average less deprived than patients that are treated by NHS hospitals.
In our sample, the average NHS patient lived in an area with a deprivation rank of 0.45,
compared to 0.39 for the average ISP patient.
The final set of characteristics is the historic referral patterns of the patient’s GP. This
reflects the likely importance of the GP in the referral decision. From HES outpatient records
detailing GP practice referrals in 2011/12 in the Orthopaedics and Trauma specialty, which
is the largest specialty by volume in the NHS and contains consultants who would see joint
replacement patients, we calculate a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of the concentration
of referrals across providers for each GP practice.25 We also use all referrals from 2009/10
to 2011/12 to calculate the share of referrals to ISPs over those three years. Table 3 shows
that patients who choose ISPs are registered at GP practices with lower concentrations of
referrals. The average patient treated by an ISP was registered with a GP practice that
referred 13.2% of patients to ISPs, compared to an average of 7.6% for those treated by
an NHS hospital. Only 1% of ISP patients were registered with GP practices that were
unamenable to private providers in the previous three years, relative to 11% of patients that
chose an NHS hospital.
than the rest of the sample, whereas the share of those with a Charlson Index of 2 or more is 6 percentage
points higher
22This is also true when we use the more detailed Patient Reported Outcome Questionnaire available for
two thirds of the sample. Even for those who report having a previous stroke or heart attack, 10% have a
hip replacement conducted by an ISP.
23Lower Super Output Areas are statistical geographical aggregation units with no administrative
jurisdiction, similar to a census tract, and are designed to be as homogeneous as possible with respect
to population composition. They contain an average of 1,500 individuals. There are approximately 32,500
LSOAs in England.
24The Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) is an local area based measure of deprivation produced by the
UK government that includes measures of income, employment, health deprivation and disability, education
skills and training, barriers to housing and services, crime and the living environment. We use the version
produced in 2010. Please see https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-indices-of-deprivation-2010
for more details.
25This is given by the sum of squared referral shares of each hospital that the GP practice refers to.
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3.2 Hospital Characteristics
We construct hospital attributes for 314 hospitals in our sample. Of these, 119 (or 38%) are
ISPs. In terms of treatments, ISPs have a market share of just 20%, however, because they
treat fewer patients per hospital (103 on average, compared to an average of 253 for NHS
hospitals).
Previous analyses of hospital choice in England and elsewhere have shown that distance is
the principal hospital attribute driving patient decisions [Beckert et al., 2012, Gaynor et al.,
2012, Kessler and McClellan, 2000].26 Figure 5 shows the distribution of patient choices,
with hospitals ordered by distance.27 The black bars indicate that 45% of patients chose
their closest hospital and 82% chose amongst their closest three. When we exclude ISPs -
which in some cases are the nearest provider - and just look at patients that chose NHS
hospitals, shown in the grey bars, 66% chose their closest NHS hospital and 91% chose from
among their three closest. The closest NHS hospital and ISP are on average 8.9km (s.d.
7.3km) and 12.7km (s.d. 10.8km) away, respectively.
Given the PCT centered healthcare funding architecture in England during the period
we consider, we also expect that where patients are treated will depend upon Primary Care
Trust areas. In our sample 64% of patients choose hospitals in the same PCT that they
reside in. This includes 64% of patients who choose NHS hospitals and 62% of patients that
choose ISPs.
Further hospital attributes driving patients’ decisions are summarized in Table 2. A large
range of quality measures is recorded for NHS hospitals, but very few of these are available
for ISPs.28 All the quality measures we use are therefore constructed using the information
available in HES. We control for hospitals’ clinical quality using the ratio of 30-day all-cause
emergency readmissions for hip replacement relative to expected readmissions at the hospital
level, given the hospital’s case mix.29 A ratio of unity indicates that the rate of readmissions
is as expected, higher ratios imply higher than expected readmissions, i.e. lower clinical
quality. The mean readmission ratio is higher for NHS hospitals than ISPs. However, there
is substantial overlap in the distributions of readmission ratios across hospital types.
We also control for hospital quality more summarily, in terms of broad hospital type
26The same pattern exists for education choices and other public services [Burgess et al., 2015].
27Distance is measured in a straight line from the centroid of the patient’s Lower Super Output Area to
the hospital postal code.
28For example, while PROMS data are relatively abundant for treatments at NHS hospitals, they are
sparse for treatments at ISPs. We therefore decided not to construct quality measures from PROMS data.
29Readmissions include any emergency readmission to any hospital for any cause within 30 days. Expected
admissions are constructed by regressing readmissions on age, sex, and prior admissions, and underlying co-
morbidities of hospital patients. We calculate average predicted readmission rates for each hospital and then
divide by the observed readmission rate.
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categorisations. The first category comprises “early FTs”, i.e. NHS hospitals that became a
“Foundation Trust” (FT) up to and including 2006. Foundation Trust status allows hospitals
a degree of independence from the Department of Health. The first hospitals were granted
Foundation Trust status in 2004. These hospitals were typically of higher quality in terms
of both, management and clinical outcomes. In subsequent years, the majority of hospitals
have become Foundation Trusts, but as a consequence the average quality of FT hospitals
has declined. We use the cut-off of 2006 in our definition of early FTs as a measure of the
highest quality hospitals. 16% of NHS hospitals are classified as early FTs.
The second category comprises Specialist Orthopaedic hospitals. There are five in total,
four NHS hospitals and one ISP. Specialist orthopaedic hospitals treat a larger number
of orthopaedic patients, and they may be a particularly relevant alternative, not only for
patients living nearby.
3.3 Descriptive Evidence on Sorting
Table 3 reveals that ISP patients are on average healthier, richer, and registered with GP
practices that refer more widely. Hospital sorting according to patient health may reflect an
efficient allocation, and is a natural consequence of the government regulations on who could
be treated by ISPs.30 In this section we provide some descriptive evidence on the mechanisms
driving sorting by local area deprivation and GP referral patterns. The mechanisms are
consistent with frictions in the market which may be regarded as undesirable or inefficient.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of local area deprivation of hip replacement patients, by
hospital type, in 2006/07, 2009/10 and 2012/13. For patients treated by NHS hospitals,
shown in the top panel, the density of patients by deprivation is flat for values of deprivation
between 0 and 0.4 and downward sloping thereafter. This pattern remained stable over
time. The bottom panel shows the distribution of local area deprivation for patients treated
by ISPs. There are two points of note. First, the distribution of hip replacement patients
is much more strongly skewed towards less deprived patients. Second, the skew towards
the least deprived areas increases over time. This is most apparent between 2006/07 and
2009/10, but the shift towards patients from less deprived areas increases further between
2009/10 and 2012/13. By 2012/13, patients in the least deprived 40% of local areas were
twice as likely to be treated by ISPs as those in the most deprived 10%.
A primary aim our analysis is to understand the extent to which the pattern observed in
Figure 6 reflects differences in the distribution of hospital attributes and patient characteris-
30In this case, the key policy question is how to remunerate hospitals. The payments made to hospitals
for treating NHS-funded patients show very limited variation and do not fully capture the variation in costs
of treating patients with different needs.
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tics other than deprivation, such as health, that will influence choice. Given the importance
of distance in determining choice, the geographical distribution of ISPs is one factor that
may be important in explaining the socioeconomic gradient in ISP use. Figure 7 shows the
distribution of deprivation for areas where the closest hospital is an ISP by year. In all
years, ISPs are more likely to be the nearest provider in less deprived areas, although this
distribution has somewhat evened out over time. Nonetheless, this suggests that location and
supply side considerations do have a role to play in access. However, it is interesting to note
that, over the same time horizon, the distribution of ISP patients became more concentrated
around the least deprived. Moreover, the slope of the deprivation density function for ISP
patients in Figure 6 is steepest between 0.4 and 1 of local area deprivation, but the slope
of the deprivation density function of areas where an ISP is the closest provider in Figure
7 is relatively stable throughout. Figure 6 shows the order of the nearest ISP by local area
deprivation decile. This again shows that ISPs are located closer to patients in less deprived
areas. However, it is important to note that even for those in the most deprived quintile,
80% have at least one ISP among their closest 3 providers.
There is a similar pattern in how ISPs are distributed across England with respect to
ethnicity. In 2009/10, 15.2% of white hip replacement patients have an ISP as their nearest
hospital, compared to 9.4% of ethnic minority patients. By 2012/13, this had increased to
31.9% of white patients and 25.1% of ethnic minority patients. On the one hand, these figures
suggests that proximity may explain a portion of the difference in ISP use by ethnicity. On
the other, the differences in proximity are relatively small, compared to the very low share
of ethnic minority patients who use ISPs.
Figure 8 shows the share of patients that had a previous emergency admission, mild
co-morbidities and severe comorbidities, by deprivation quintile.31 As expected, underlying
health declines with local area deprivation. For previous emergency admissions and mild
comorbidities, the declines in health are largely confined to the most deprived half of the
distribution. There is a small difference in the underlying health by ethnicity, with share of
ethnic minority patients with prior emergency admissions 2 percentage points higher than
for the white population, and slightly more comorbidities.
These descriptives results suggest that differences in patient health could explain part
of the observed sorting patterns, but some sorting by local area deprivation and to a lesser
extent ethnicity appears unexplained. For example, the share of ethnic minorities that choose
an ISP (7.5%) is approximately equal to share of patients with both low income (living in the
poorest fifth of local areas) and poor underlying health (have a prior emergency admission)
who choose an ISP.
31Here, the value 1 represents the least deprived quintile.
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4 Econometric Choice Model
4.1 Patient Level Choice Model
We use a random utility model (RUM) to describe the patient’s discrete hospital choice
problem. We consider a mixed multinomial logit (MMNL) model that allows us to capture a
wide spectrum of patient level heterogeneity, exhibits unrestricted substitution patterns and
does not impose a correlation structure across choice alternatives. More tightly specified
alternatives in the logit family, such a conditional or nested logit models, while yielding
more efficient estimates, embed the risk of being misspecified and consequently yielding
inconsistent estimators. As demonstrated by [McFadden and Train, 2000], an appropriately
rich MMNL specification can arbitrarily closely approximate any RUM for discrete choice.
This flexibility renders it an attractive econometric framework for analysis.
Consider hip replacement patient i. Let g(i) denote i’s GP (practice).32 And suppose
that g(i) offers i to choose among a set of NHS hospitals Ng(i) and a set of ISPs Ig(i). Then,
patient i’s choice set is given by Jg(i) = Ng(i) ∪ Ig(i). Let Uij denote i’s indirect conditional
utility from having the procedure carried out at hospital j, j ∈ Jg(i), and consider the
specification
Uij = x
′
ijβi + ij,
where xij is a K-vector of hospital attributes that may vary across patients, such as distance
between patient and hospital. The vector βi is a vector of possibly random coefficients,
βik = βk + z
′
iθk + σkνik, k = 1, · · · , K,
where zi is a vector of patient level characteristics, σik > 0 for random coefficient and zero
otherwise, and νik is an independent standard normally distributed random variable. In this
model, βk + z
′
iθk captures the conditional mean of the random coefficient βik on hospital
attribute k, given patient characteristics zi, or the observed heterogeneity in i’s valuation of
attribute k. The contribution σkνik to βik, in turn, captures unobserved heterogeneity in i’s
valuation of attribute k. The term ij captures unobserved taste variation across hospitals
that is not quantified by hospital attributes xij. The collection {ij, j ∈ Jg(i)} is assumed
to be i.i.d. EV (0, 1). Patient i chooses the hospital associated with the highest indirect
conditional utility. Let Dij = 1 if patient i is observed to choose alternative j, and Dij = 0
otherwise. Then,
Dij = 1 ⇔ Uij = max{Uin, n ∈ Jg(i)}.
32In line with the informational content of our data, which identify a patient’s GP practice, but not the
individual GP, in much of our discussion we refer to GP and GP practice synonymously.
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This model can be estimated by Maximum Simulated Likelihood [Hajivassiliou, 2000].
We include an ISP dummy among those attributes in xij that carry a random coefficient,
i.e. xijk = 1{j∈Ig(i)} and σk ≥ 0. Heterogeneity in sorting into ISPs then operates through the
interactions of xijk with zi. By controlling for i’s health and GP g(i)’s referral pattern among
zi, the model allows us to identify differential sorting, conditional on access and health, with
respect to other patient socio-demographics, e.g. deprivation of the area the patient lives in.
Our MMNL model endows two other hospital attributes with random coefficients: distance,
and the 30-day emergency readmissions ratio.
4.2 Choice Sets
The model, as specified, assumes that choice sets Jg(i) may vary across GP practices, but
do not vary across patients within GP practice. We consider two definitions of the choice
sets Jg(i). In line with standard practice [Beckert et al., 2012, Ho, 2006], the first approach
defines Jg(i) by distance to the GP practice, as the ten nearest hospitals conducting at least
20 procedures, plus all specialist hospitals within 50km; we refer to choice sets according
to this definition as “distance choice sets”33. Among the 63.120 patients in our sample, the
average number of ISPs in their distance choice sets is 3.9, and 80 per cent of them have
between 3 and 5 ISPs.
The second approach defines Jg(i) as the set of hospital alternatives that the GP referred
patients to over the last three years; we refer to choice sets according to this definition as
“GP choice sets”. We do so to reflect both the role of the GP as the gatekeeper and patient
advisor when making referrals in the English NHS and the relationship between ISP use and
previous GP referrals described in Table 3. These choice sets are constructed by proxying the
alternatives offered to the patient by the set of hospitals that the GP practice has referred to
in the previous three years within the Orthopaedics and Trauma specialty.34 This approach
33Distances are measured in a straight line from the centroid or central point of the patient’s Lower Super
Output Area to the post code of the hospital. We include only hospitals that perform at least 20 hip
operations in 2012/13, as hospitals that perform very low volumes may not be in patient choice sets. This
is a particular problem for ISPs where a relatively large fraction of sites perform very few procedures. For
example, reducing the minimum threshold from 20 to 5 procedures increases the number of relevant ISPs by
22%, but these smaller sites accounted for just 2.7% of ISP patients in 2010/11 and 0.5% of all NHS funded
patients. We include additional Specialist Orthopaedic hospitals within 50km, as these are hospitals that
patient predominately choose when not picking one of their nearest 10. Patients that chose a hospital outside
their nearest 10, plus nearby specialist hospitals, are dropped, which removes 7% of the patient sample.
34To construct these choices, we take all referrals by that GP within Orthopaedics and Trauma over the
period 2009 to 2012 (with an average of 420 referrals), and include hospitals where the GP referred more than
0.5% of patients, plus any sites where any hip replacement patients were referred to in our hip replacement
sample. This is reasonable approximation of the alternatives that may have been considered, and avoids
any restrictions on the size of the choice set from using only hip replacement patients. Again, we restrict to
hospitals that conducted 20 or more hip replacements in 2012/12
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generates variation in the size and composition of the choice set size at the GP level. We
believe that this approach is a strong proxy for the choices offered to patients, as referral to a
provider indicates either pre-existing knowledge or subsequent knowledge obtained following
feedback from patients [Dixon et al., 2010a] 35
Figure 2 shows the composition of distance and GP choice sets and demonstrates that
the GP choice set typically contains fewer alternatives than the distance choice set. The
number of alternatives in the GP choice has an approximately normal distribution, with
most practices offering between 2 and 12 alternatives.
Figure 3 and 4 split alternatives into NHS hospitals and ISPs, and show that the number
of alternatives offered in the GP choice set is lower for both types of provider. The median
number of ISP alternatives is 4 in the distance choice set but only 1 in the GP choice set.
Comparing the size of the choice sets in Figures 2 - 4 highlights both the large variation
in the number of choices that are offered across GP practices and that the majority of GP
practices refer to far fewer than the 10 hospitals we consider in the distance choice set model.
The sets of hospitals presented to patients by their GP can be thought of as outcome of at
least three different competing processes. First, GPs may act as a patient surrogate, i.e. as
an altruistic agent who presents patients only with the highest ranked alternatives. A GP
might therefore exclude hospitals that are far away and of low quality. In a full information
setting, in principle the GP could choose on behalf of the patient, and a mandate to offer
choice would be unnecessary.
Second, information on providers is often costly to acquire and to disseminate. The
costs of information acquisition mean that the patient is likely to defer to the GP in terms
of choice alternatives to consider, but also imply that GPs may not acquire knowledge
about all providers. This is supported by results from GP surveys which indicate that GPs
rely on “soft” knowledge from previous experience and referrals, rather than comparing
clinical indicators [Dixon et al., 2010a]. Incomplete information on the part of the GP
may be particularly relevant for the inclusion of ISPs, as the providers are new and GPs
will have less information based on previous referrals. The cost of communicating and
disseminating information about choice options to patients is costly both to GPs themselves
and for patients, where large choice sets may complicate the choice problem (see, for example,
Kamenica [2008] on the tyranny of choice and choice overload). As a result, GPs may limit
the number hospital alternatives they present to patients to a small number, either because
(i) GPs do not have an incentive to acquire information about further hospitals or (ii)
35One possibility is that this approach falsely excludes providers that are never chosen, but given the
costs of transmitting information about additional providers to patients, it seems unlikely that GPs would
continue to offer providers that patients never chose.
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some hospitals that the GP does have information about are withheld 36. The resulting
narrow choice set may exclude hospital alternatives that patients would rank highly if they
had perfect information. This pre-selection is potentially efficient, conditional the costs of
information acquisition and dissemination, because it saves patients the cost of collecting
the necessary information themselves. The question is then whether there is a way of
reducing these information costs to overcome the market friction. Efficiency also hinges
on the incentives of GP and patient being aligned.
Finally, if GPs face incentives that are not aligned with those of the patient, then such
pre-selection on the part of the GP may be distortive. It comprises situations in which
GPs are uninformed about, or unresponsive to, evaluation criteria relevant to patients; and
situations in which GPs face idiosyncratic incentives that patients are unaware of. For
example, the contracts granted to Wave 1 ISTCs, which compensate providers for a fixed
number of procedures, irrespective of whether those procedures were conducted, provided
GPs with an incentive to refer to those providers; patients would not know or care about
the underlying financial arrangements.
Any difference in choice sets resulting from the first mechanism, where GPs act as
altruistic agents, do not limit competition or affect consumer welfare. The second and third
mechanism, imperfect information and differential incentives, imply frictions in the market
for choice which may be ameliorated with policy reforms.
While a formally incorporating the GP level choice set formation process into our model is
beyond the scope of this paper, Appendix A presents estimates from a model that examines
the determinants of the GP’s binary decision whether or not to include the hospital in the
GP choice set37. The model examines the relative importance of the three aforementioned
scenarios: the fully informed GP, informational asymmetries, and GPs’ idiosyncratic incen-
tives. Our estimates conform to all three mechanisms we highlight and the findings from the
GP survey summarized in Dixon et al. [2010a]. Higher quality hospitals are more likely to
be included in GP choice sets, but the magnitude of the quality effect is small. By contrast,
the inclusion of a hospital in a GP choice set is strongly associated with features of local
health care organisation unrelated to patient health. And these determinants dominate the
hospital quality effects or population health characteristics. In particular, GPs are much
36These assumptions are consistent with evidence [Dixon et al., 2010b, Monitor, 2015] that, the choice
mandate notwithstanding, the majority of patients gets to discuss no more than five options with the GP
and that GPs feel that they operate under resource constraints that do not permit them to discuss more
options while seeing the same number of patients. Such resource constraints suggest that GPs decide on a
relatively tightly delineated, standardized set of alternatives that they discuss with their patients
37See Beckert and Collyer [2016], Goeree [2008] and Gaynor et al. [2016] for examples; Crawford et al.
[2016] study demand estimation in the absence of accurate and quantifiable information on the true choice
sets
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more likely to refer to NHS hospitals within the same PCT. This may reflect some inertia in
referral practices dating back to block contracting in the early 2000s, or a desire to maintain
the revenues of hospitals that provide emergency care for their patients. For ISPs, the odds
of a Wave 1 ISTC being included in a GP choice set are nine times that of a pre-existing
private hospital. This is consistent with the incentives to refer to these providers until the
initial contracts ended (typically 2010 or 2011). By contrast, for Wave 2 ISTCs, where the
incentive to refer was much weaker, the odds of inclusion in GP choice sets were double that
of a private hospital.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Results
Tables 4 and 5 show the parameter estimates from the mixed logit models based on the
distance and GP choice sets38
The parameter estimates for the mean valuations of hospital attributes are presented in
Table 4. The parameter estimates from the “distance choice set” model on the right hand
side of the Table provide similar results to existing work on patient choice. Patients have a
preference for shorter travel distances, shorter waiting times and higher quality. We find that
specialist hospitals are more likely to be chosen and ISPs less likely to be chosen. Patients are
more likely to choose hospitals within the same PCT, holding all other hospital characteristics
constant. The random coefficient parameters indicate significant heterogeneity in valuations
of distance and ISPs, but no unobserved variations in the emergency readmission rate.
This finding might be explained by patients deferring to their GP with regard to quality
assessments [Dixon and Robertson, 2009, Monitor, 2015]. In an incomplete information
setting like the one considered here, quality is likely assessed via the patients’ GPs who
possess superior information. GPs, in turn, may have relatively homogeneous information
on hospital quality and thus are unlikely to vary significantly in their quality assessments.
The GP choice set model produces a similar pattern of estimates. Responses to quality,
as measured by emergency readmissions and early FT status are slightly smaller (relative to
other attributes such as distance). This is perhaps explained by GP pre-selection eliminating
lower quality hospitals. Specialist hospitals are also valued more highly under the GP choice
set model.
Table 5 presents parameter estimates for interactions between hospital type and patient
and GP characteristics. Starting again with the distance choice set parameter estimates, we
38The remaining parameters estimated by the models are available on request
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find that as with the raw data, patients from deprived areas, ethnic minorities and those
with underlying ill-health are less likely to seek treatment at an ISP. This suggests that the
hypothesis that the differences in use by income and ethnic minority status are explained
by different distributions of underlying health is not supported. Patients who are registered
with GP practices with high referral concentrations or low prior referral shares to ISPs are
less likely to choose an ISP, which is consistent with an important role played by GPs in the
choice making process.
The parameter estimates of the GP choice set model produce a similar pattern of results
with respect to ethnicity and health, albeit with slighter smaller magnitudes. In both models,
the magnitude of the interaction between ISP and ethnic minority is approximately equal
to the interaction between ISP and having a previous emergency hospital admission. These
parameters indicate that ISP patients are healthier even accounting for distance and the
hospital choices that are available, which is unsurprising given the eligibility criteria for
ISPs. Ethnic minorities are less likely to use ISPs, even when controlling for distance to
ISPs, differences in deprivation, or observable measures of health.
In contrast, how the choice set is specified does affect the parameter estimates for variation
in ISP use by local area deprivation. While the estimated parameter is statistically significant
in the distance choice set model, the parameter in the GP choice set model is small and not
statistically significant. We therefore conclude that any sorting by local area deprivation
can be explained by a combination of patient health characteristics and the hospital choices
patients were offered, and that a share of the sorting by local area deprivation that is observed
is related to the restrictions placed on the choice sets of more deprived patients. GP prior
referral characteristics continue to play a strong role in the GP choice set model, although the
magnitude of the importance of prior ISP referrals relative to overall referral concentration
is reduced.
The final three parameter estimates presented in Table 5 consider heterogeneity in Speci-
alist Orthopaedic hospital use by ethnic minority status, local area deprivation and previous
emergency hospital admission (to proxy for underlying ill health). Parameter estimates from
the distance choice set model suggest that ethnic minorities are more likely to choose a
specialist hospital. However, in the GP choice set model the parameter estimate is negative
and not statistically significant. This suggests that ethnic minorities are more likely to use a
specialist hospital due to the geographic distribution of specialist hospitals in urban centres.
When the choice set that patients are presented with by the GP is controlled for in the GP
choice set model, they are no longer more likely to choose a specialist hospital.
The pattern is similar for deprivation. In the distance choice set model, more deprived
patients are equally likely to choose a specialist hospital, whereas under the GP choice set
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deprived patients are less likely to choose specialist hospitals.
Finally, the estimates also show that patients with previous admissions are less likely to
choose specialist hospital, irrespective of the choice set definition that is used.
5.2 GP Level Random Coefficients
The estimated models using the distance and GP choice set definitions have both assumed
that random coefficients operate at the patient level. Given the likely role of the GP in
forming choice sets and offering advice, it is possible that unobserved variation in preferences
is not attributable to the patient, but instead to the GP. We therefore re-estimate the GP
choice set model with random coefficients at the GP level. This amounts to re-interpreting
the choice outcomes as those that a GP might arrive at when deciding on behalf of each of
the GP’s patients. This model serves as a robustness check on our preferred specifications,
although the results are difficult to interpret.
For mean valuations of hospital attributes, this model entails the largest effect, relative
to our baseline specifications, on estimates for the ISP attribute and emergency readmission.
The negative parameter estimate for ISP use is smaller in absolute value than for the patient
level model, as is the extent of the observed variation. This suggests that GPs experience less
heterogeneity in valuations of ISPs. For emergency readmissions, the estimated parameter
remains negative and statistically significant, but the random coefficient goes from very
small and not statistically significant in the distance and GP choice set model to sizeable
and statistically significant when random coefficients are estimated at the GP level.
While the estimates of the remaining coefficients, notably on the various interactions, are
broadly similar to those of our preferred specifications, the aforementioned discrepancies are
difficult to interpret. The GP model can be thought of as a version of a choice model that
in a somewhat opaque manner blends the patient’s and GP’s contributions to the choice
outcome. For example, the randomness in valuation of quality could arise from the GP
observing patient characteristics that the econometrician does not observe and that lead the
GP to choose a hospital for the patient that excels along other dimensions relative to quality.
We include the results from this model because they demonstrate the robustness of our
headline results to modelling assumptions, while cautioning against attempts to directly
interpret the results from this model.
21
6 Counterfactual Simulations
6.1 Underlying Assumptions
The model estimates indicate that after conditioning on GP choice sets the difference by
deprivation is removed, and the ethnic minority and health parameter estimates shrink
towards zero. In this section we consider two counterfactual simulations that examine the
extent to which the patients’ GP contributes to how patients with different characteristics
sort into ISPs.
To do so we construct two simulations using, for each patient, choice sets of feasible GP
practice, where feasible practices are defined as those where at least 10 patients from the
same MSOA are registered as the patient whose choices are simulated39. The first, “patient
focussed” simulation moves patients to local GP practices that have the largest number of
ISPs in their GP choice set. The second, “GP focussed” simulation adds alternatives to the
patient’s current GP practice choice set, based on the GP choice set of the GP practice with
the most referrals to ISPs.
Our assumptions for these simulations are as follows. For simulation 1, we assume that
the reallocated patients do not alter the choice set provided by the GP. For simulation 2,
we assume that the costs to the GP of providing more choice are minimal, so that there is
no capacity constraint. Finally, for both simulations, we assume that there is no capacity
constraint at the hospital level, so that additional patients to do not change the attributes
of alternatives. Given that characteristics such as waiting times may change, the predicted
demand shift is an upper bound of the expected effects.
Figure 9 shows the mean number of ISPs in the choice set by local area deprivation
quintile, for the status quo – i.e. the observed GP choice set – and each of the two
simulation scenarios. For all quintiles, the mean number of ISPs in the choice sets under the
simulation scenarios increases relative to the status quo. The absolute increases are similar
across quintiles but the proportionate increases are greatest at the bottom. This is despite
the simulations not taking local area deprivation into account. The pattern is similar for
ethnicity. Ethnic minority patients have an average of 1 ISP in their choice set, compared
to 1.5 for White British/Irish patients. The simulated choice sets both increase the mean by
0.5 ISPs, thus the absolute difference remains unchanged but the relative difference falls.
The pattern by ill-health is quite different, as shown by Figure ??, which gives the mean
number of ISPs in the GP choice sets conditional on previous admissions. Patients with
a previous emergency admission have on average 0.022 fewer ISPs in their choice set than
39We have conducted the same simulation using a 2.5km radius and obtained similar results
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other patients. The simulated choice sets do not change this pattern. This suggests that
underlying health of patients, at least to the extent it is visible by the econometrician, is not
what is driving choice set formation.
6.2 Simulation Results
Table 7 shows the estimated probability of choosing an ISP under the model and the
simulated probability of choosing an ISP under the two simulation scenarios for all patients,
and by three sets of patient characteristics: local area deprivation, ethnicity, and underlying
health (previous emergency admission). The simulated ISP probabilities are obtained by
summing up the predicted probabilities for the ISP alternatives for all patients.
Relative to the data, the GP choice set model predicts a higher share of ISP use overall
(19.2 vs 25.9), but the gradient by local area deprivation quintile is similar. Both simulations
increase the share of ISPs, by construction. However, the gradient is reduced. In simulation
1, where patients are reallocated to different practices, the difference between ISP use for
the richest and poorest quintile falls from 7.9 percentage points on the basis of the model
to 4.1 percentage points in the first simulation. In the second simulation, where additional
alternatives are added to the choice set of the patient’s own GP practice, the difference falls
to 3.8 percentage points.
The second panel of Table 7 presents the simulations for ethnicity. Here, the data shows
a 12.2 percentage point difference in the share of patients who use ISPs, this compares
to an 11.5 percentage point difference using model estimates. These differences are large
relative to income, where moving from the richest to the poorest richest quintiles of areas
only reduces ISP use by 7.9 percentage points. As with deprivation, the simulations result
reduce the difference between White British/Irish and ethnic minorities to 7.6 percentage
points in simulation 1 and 6.7 percentage points in simulation 2.
The final panel considers the impact of the simulations on the expected ISP shares by
whether the patient has had an emergency admission in the previous three years. Here
there are two points to note. First, the model over-predicts the share of patients with
previous emergency admissions that choose ISPs and under-predicts the difference, with a 1.8
percentage point difference in the expected share of ISP patients, relative to 9.7 percentage
points in the data. Second, in contrast to the results for ethnicity and local area deprivation,
the simulations increase, rather than decrease, the differences in ISP use by underlying
health. The absence of a change in expected ISP share as a result of the simulation is
unsurprising, as Figure ??, ill-health was not associated with a significant reduction in the
number of ISPs that were included in GP hospital choice sets. This also suggests that much
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of the sorting by health appears related to restrictions in who can be treated by ISPs, rather
than the geographic distribution of ISPs, or frictions in the choices that are offered.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we study mechanisms of patient sorting between private and public providers
of publicly funded elective medical treatments in the English National Health Service. Un-
derstanding these mechanisms is important for at least three reasons. First, inequality in
access to, and uptake of, private provision is potentially important for welfare, especially
when private providers are able to deliver care much faster than public providers, and where
patient satisfaction and quality are arguably superior NHS Partners Network [2015]. Second,
in a system of national prices that do not necessarily fully compensate for differences in
the severity of patient illness, different patient types entail different cost implications for
providers, and these differences matter acutely when budgets and capacity are constrained.
Finally, policies to expand market access to private providers are often introduced to generate
competitive pressure on public incumbents, with the aim of improving efficiency, quality and
innovation. Unequal access implies the threat of patients switching provider is below its
full potential, and hence public providers may be expected to experience less competitive
pressure than intended by the policy reform.
Our results for hip replacements reveal inequality in patient sorting into private provision
along several dimensions. In particular, we find that patients with worse underlying health,
those living in deprived areas and those that belong to an ethnic minority are less likely to
choose an ISP. Differences in ISP usage by health are to be expected, given that there are
health related eligibility criteria for ISP treatment. Reasons for variation in use by local
area deprivation and ethnicity are more subtle. The comparison of our estimates from the
distance and the GP choice set specifications reveals that differences in ISP use by local
area deprivation that are not accounted for by geography, local hospital provision or patient
health, can be explained by differences in the choice set that the patients’ GP is likely to
present to them. Differences in ISP by ethnicity and underlying health remain but are muted
somewhat.
The influence that the GP exerts on patients’ choice outcomes via the choice set offered
to choose from is further illustrated in our counterfactual simulations. In a GP focussed
simulation, where we force GPs to include additional local choice alternatives into the choice
set offered to patients, we show that the difference in predicted ISP choice probabilities
between the richest and poorest quintile of patients decreases by close to 50 percent. This
equalizing effect is slightly more muted in our patient focussed simulation, where we re-assign
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patients to nearby GPs that are the most amenable to including ISPs in the offered choice
set. We find similar effects for the predicted ISP choice differences between white British
patients and those from ethnic minorities. The simulations do not affect the share of patients
with previous emergency admissions who are predicted to choose an ISP.
The simulations are insightful for policy makers. While initiatives aiming to replicate
the GP focussed scenario may be expected to induce more equality, they are likely to face
more resistance, given the known constraints GPs operate under. The patient focussed
scenario offers a potentially attractive alternative. It suggests a similar equalizing effect by
empowering patients: While patients choose their GP on the basis of many criteria, offering
them information on how amenable GPs are to facilitating choice may allow more patients
to benefit from choice and strengthen the competitive pressure on providers generated by
choice policies.
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Figure 2: The distribution of the number alternatives in patient choice sets
Notes Sample is restricted to those hospitals that are recorded as conducting at least 20
NHS-funded elective hip replacements in the NHS Hospital Episode Statistics in the given
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Figure 3: The distribution of the number NHS alternatives in patient choice sets
Notes Sample is restricted to those NHS hospitals that are recorded as conducting at least
20 NHS-funded elective hip replacements in the NHS Hospital Episode Statistics in the given
Figure 4: The distribution of the number ISP alternatives in patient choice sets
Notes Sample is restricted to those Independent Sector Providers that are recorded as
conducting at least 20 NHS-funded elective hip replacements in the NHS Hospital Episode
Statistics in the given
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Figure 5: Distribution of Patient Choices, Hospitals Ordered by Distance
Notes: Distances are calculated in a straight line between the centroid of the patient’s local
area (LSOA) and the postcode of the hospital. The grey bars exclude patients that chose
treatment at ISPs.
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Figure 6: Local Area Deprivation of Hip Replacement Patients, by Provider Type
(2006/07, 2009/10 and 2012/13)
Notes: Local area deprivation takes values between zero and one, with zero representing the
least deprived local area (LSOA) and one the most deprived local area in England.
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Figure 7: Distribution of Deprivation of Local Areas where ISPs are the Closest
Hip Replacement Provider (2006/07, 2009/10 and 2012/13)
Notes: This Figure plots the distribution of the deprivation (IMD) rank of LSOAs that have
an ISP as their nearest provider. The local area with the lowest deprivation in England takes
the value zero; the local area with the highest level of deprivation take the value 1. There
are 32,500 LSOAs in total in England. In 2006/07 there were 500 that had an ISP as the
closest provider; in 2009/10 3545 and in 2012/13, 8012.
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Figure 8: Share of Patients with Underlying Health Problems by Local Area
Deprivation Quintiles.)
Notes: Quintile 1 corresponds the least deprived fifth of areas on the basis of IMD. Quintile
5 corresponds the most deprived quintile of areas. Local area deprivation measures by Index
of Multiple Deprivation rank of the patient’s lower super output area
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Figure 9: Number of ISPs by model and simulation choice sets and deprivation
quintile
Notes: Simulation 1 moves patients to GP practices which have choice sets with the most ISPs
in the patient’s local area. Simulation 2 expands GP choice sets to add the alternatives that are
referred to by GP practices in the local area that referred to the most ISPs.
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Figure 10: Number of ISPs by choice set and prior admissions
Notes: Simulation 1 moves patients to GP practices which have choice sets with the most ISPs
in the patient’s local area. Simulation 2 expands GP choice sets to add the alternatives that are
referred to by GP practices in the local area that referred to the most ISPs. Admissions in the
previous three years (1095 days).
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Table 1: ISP Types
Wave 1 Wave 2
Wave 1 ISTC Wave 2 ISTC AQP
Year commenced 2003 2006 2006
Year last contract ended 2011 2015 -
Payment Contracted procedure num-
bers, full payment guaran-
teed
Payments for fixed costs
guaranteed, per procedure
thereafter.
Per procedure
Patients NHS patients only NHS patients only NHS patients and private
pay patients
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Table 2: Means of Hospital Attributes, by Provider Type
NHS ISP All
Attributes with RC
30 Day Em Readmit Ratio (2012) 0.91 1.09 1.02
(1=expected) (0.42) (0.64) (0.53)
Attributes without RC
Median Waiting Time ) 87 45.3 71.2
(days, 2012/13 (23.3) (33.2) (34.1)
Share Early Found Trusts 0.160 N/A 0.10
(0.37) N/A (0.30)
Share Specialist Hosps 0.0205 0.008 0.016
(0.142) (0.091) (0.125)
Patients 253.3 103.4 196.5
(174.0) (96.0) (166.0)
Hospitals 195 119 314
Notes: The sample includes hospitals that treated at least 20 patients in 2012/13. Waiting times are
measured from the date of the decision to admit for a procedure and the date of the admission for the
procedure. The 30 day emergency admission rate is given by predicting readmissions based on a regression
of readmissions on the age, sex and underlying health of patients and dividing the actual readmissions, by
the expected number. An ISP is defined as a hospital site that has a code in HES that begins with an ”N”.
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Table 3: Mean patient characteristics by chosen provider type
ISP NHS Difference
Age 68.2 68.6 -0.4***
(10.0) (11.6) (0.1)
Ethnic Minority 0.013 0.039 -0.025***
(0.115) (0.193) (0.002)
Female 0.598 0.601 -0.002
(0.49) (0.49) (0.005)
Local Area Deprivation 0.391 0.45 -0.058***
(Scaled 0-1) (0.253) (0.275) (0.003)
Moderate Comorbidity 0.167 0.225 -0.058***
(CI=1) (0.373) (0.418) (0.004)
Severe Comorbidity 0.044 0.096 -0.052***
(CI>1) (0.205) (0.295) (0.003)
Prev Emergency Admission 0.132 0.230 -0.098***
(0.338) (0.421) (0.004)
Prev Elective Admission 0.481 0.568 -0.088***
(0.500) (0.495) (0.005)
GP ref HHI (2011) 0.548 0.607 -0.059***
(0.178) (0.197) (0.002)
GP 3 year ISP ref share 0.13 0.077 0.054***
(2009/10-2011/12) (0.106) (0.086) (0.001)
N 50,525 12,357
Notes: Ethnic minority are those not classed as White British or Irish.
Comorbidities measured using the Charlson Index. Previous admissions in
the previous 3 years (1095 days) for any cause.
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Table 6: Mixed Logit Results: GP level model
Coeff SE p-value
Attributes with RC
Distance
Mean -0.0699 0.0067 0.000
SD 0.0616 0.0016 0.000
ISP
Mean -1.1008 0.1736 0.000
SD 1.0180 0.0242 0.000
Emergency Readmissions
Mean -0.8762 0.1603 0.000
SD -1.4226 0.0345 0.000
Attributes w/out RC
Early Foundation Trust 0.3338 0.1527 0.015
Waiting times (weeks) -0.1208 0.0145 0.000
Specialist Orthopedic Hosp 3.0329 0.1650 0.000
Same PCT -0.0740 0.1062 0.243
Observable Heterogeneity
ISP x Age 0.0042 0.0015 0.003
ISP x Ethnic Minority -0.7147 0.1210 0.000
ISP x Deprivation -0.0321 0.0756 0.336
ISP x Prev Em Admit -0.6169 0.0444 0.000
ISP x Prev El Admit -0.3155 0.0339 0.000
ISP x CI of 1 -0.3722 0.0418 0.000
ISP x CI of 2+ -0.8859 0.0689 0.000
ISP x GP HHI -0.3495 0.1577 0.014
ISP x GP refs to ISPs 1.1941 0.3181 0.000
Spec Hosp x Ethnic Minority -0.0501 0.1091 0.323
Spec Hosp x Deprivation -0.3905 0.0874 0.000
Spec Hosp x Pre Em Admit -0.1141 0.0534 0.016
Notes: The sample includes all patients who had an elective hip replace-
ment in financial year 2012/13 and chose one of the ten closest hospitals
to the centroid of their LSOA. The full model also includes interactions
between all patient characteristics and all hospital attributes. Random
coefficients are estimated at the GP Practice level.
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Table 7: Simulation Results: Expected ISP Share by Patient Characteristics
Data GPCS Sim 1 Sim 2
Model Moving pats Adding Alts
All 19.2 25.9 28.7 27.6
Local Area Deprivation Quintile
1 (richest) 22.1 27.1 30.2 28.6
2 21.3 26.2 30.2 29.1
3 20.3 24.9 29.5 28.6
4 15.9 21.1 27.5 26.1
5 (poorest) 12.1 19.2 26.1 24.8
Difference Quintile 1-5 10.0 7.9 4.1 3.8
Ethnicity
White British/Irish 19.6 27.0 29.2 27.8
Ethnic Minority 7.4 15.5 21.6 21.1
Difference 12.2 11.5 7.6 6.7
Previous Emergency Admission
No 22.9 24.9 26.3 25.4
Yes 13.2 26.7 29.2 28.4
Difference 9.7 1.8 2.9 2.9
Calculated by summing the predicted probabilities for ISP alternatives for all patients
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A GP Choice Set Determinants
The GP choice sets used to estimate the GP choice set model are determined by referral
patterns over the previous three years (2009/10 - 2011/12). We include hospitals where GP
practices referred more than 0.5% of patients. the mean number of referrals was 420 per GP
practice. We then add any hospital that a GP referred a hip replacement patient to in that
year, if these are no already included in the sample.
This section estimates a logit model for whether each of the 313 hospitals that conducted
at least 20 procedures were included in choice set. Results are presented in Table A1. Column
1 shows the odds that an NHS hospital is in a GP choice set given the characteristics of the
hospital. As expected, the odds of inclusion decline with distance, increase in hospital quality
and decline in waiting times. This fits with the model of GPs acting as altruistic agents for
their patients. However, the role of quality is relatively weak. This is consistent with
responses to a survey of Providers in 2008 and 2009, where it was perceived that GP referral
patterns paid little attention to quality [Dixon et al., 2010a]. Specialist Orthopedic hospitals
are 78 times more likely to be included in GP choice sets, holding other characteristics
constant, and hospitals located in the same Primary Care Trust (PCT) are 22 times more
likely to be included. NHS acute hospitals are separate from PCTs, however this within
PCT effect may be explained by differences in information on GPs wishing to ensure that
hospitals where their patients receive emergency treatment continue to receive a stream of
funding.
The factors that determine whether an ISP is included in a GP choice set are similar
to those for an NHS hospital. Factors of importance to patients, such as distance, waiting
times, and clinical do affect referrals, although the effect of quality is relatively small. The
type of ISP is a very strong determinant. The odds of including an ISP are 13 times higher
for Wave 1 ISTCs and 3 times higher for Wave 2 ISTCs, relative to hospitals that also
treat private patients. As all ISPs place similar restrictions on the types of patients that
are eligible for ISP treatment, this must operate either through differences in information on
incentives to refer. In particular, Wave 1 ISTCs received payments for contracted procedures
whether or not undertaken. Primary Care Trusts therefore had an incentive to ask GPs to
refer. In common with NHS hospitals, ISPs are more likely to be included in choice sets if
they are located in the same PCT, although the magnitude of this difference is lower (with
odds six times higher for ISPs, relative to 22 times higher for NHS hospitals). There are no
clear incentives for GPs or Primary Care Trusts for favouring ISPs within the same PCT,
suggesting that this is likely to reflect imperfect information rather than incentives.
Columns 3 and 4 add the characteristics of the local area including the share of the
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MSOA population that is non white, the share over 65 and local area deprivation. These
coefficients capture whether these characteristics affect the average number of alternatives of
each provider type are included. For both types of provider, areas with high ethnic minority
populations attend GP practices that refer to fewer hospitals. The magnitude is greater
for ISPs. This is consistent with results of the ? survey, where GPs noted that language
difficulties may limit the extent to which ethnic minority patients can participate in choice.
The share of those over 75 also has a small positive association with the number of hospitals
in the choice set. The relationship between consideration set size and local area deprivation
is not statistically significant.
Columns 5 and 6 include characteristics of the GP practice. Number of hospitals in GP
consideration sets increase with the practice list size and the number of GPs in the practice.
Consideration sets are small in GP practices with higher shares of GPs from outside the UK
and EEA and the share of younger GPs under the age of 40.
Finally, columns 7 and 8 include characteristics of the nearest hospital. Consideration
sets are larger when there are fewer hospitals in each GP practice. ISP alternatives are
increasing in the waiting times of the nearest NHS hospital.
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Table A1: The odds that a hospital is included in a GP choice set
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Hosp chars + loc area +GP practice + local healthcare
NHS ISP NHS ISP NHS ISP NHS ISP
Log Distance 0.0892*** 0.0641*** 0.0696*** 0.0506*** 0.0676*** 0.0479*** 0.0448*** 0.0301***
(0.00607) (0.00823) (0.00449) (0.00641) (0.00438) (0.00610) (0.00269) (0.00398)
Emergency Readmissions 0.545*** 0.914 0.600*** 0.966 0.596*** 0.967 0.677*** 1.014
(0.0572) (0.135) (0.0595) (0.141) (0.0596) (0.142) (0.0618) (0.136)
Wait Times 0.996** 1.000 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.997 0.999 0.994**
(0.00151) (0.00249) (0.00158) (0.00248) (0.00158) (0.00247) (0.00153) (0.00228)
Early FT 1.069 0.998 0.999 0.992
(0.120) (0.112) (0.114) (0.110)
spec ortho 77.95*** 85.80*** 92.80*** 137.3*** 95.01*** 151.5*** 124.2*** 321.7***
(8.308) (29.68) (9.940) (47.81) (10.31) (53.58) (12.79) (118.1)
Same PCT 21.77*** 6.203*** 14.40*** 4.076*** 13.92*** 3.927*** 8.810*** 2.513***
(6.660) (1.514) (3.922) (0.942) (3.817) (0.902) (1.842) (0.456)
Phase 1 ISTC 13.01*** 11.36*** 10.88*** 9.413***
(3.343) (2.854) (2.737) (2.342)
Phase 2 ISTC 2.896*** 2.121*** 2.185*** 2.718***
(0.785) (0.616) (0.625) (0.710)
Local Area Deprivation 1.050 0.647 1.205 0.818 1.308* 1.033
(0.197) (0.184) (0.225) (0.235) (0.207) (0.227)
Share of population non
white
0.0597*** 0.0107*** 0.0614*** 0.0120*** 0.292*** 0.0849***
(0.0246) (0.00862) (0.0255) (0.00949) (0.0978) (0.0436)
Share of Population over 75 1.066*** 1.088*** 1.066*** 1.088*** 1.056*** 1.097***
(0.0231) (0.0272) (0.0220) (0.0249) (0.0163) (0.0200)
List Size 1.035*** 1.024** 1.029*** 1.019**
(0.00802) (0.0110) (0.00684) (0.00956)
GP practice GPs (rel to sin-
gle practitioner)
2-3 1.150** 1.471*** 1.055 1.364***
(0.0694) (0.170) (0.0602) (0.145)
4-6 1.204** 1.837*** 1.075 1.581***
(0.104) (0.284) (0.0831) (0.221)
7+ 1.309** 2.096*** 1.116 1.678***
(0.155) (0.428) (0.114) (0.304)
PCT GP non EEA 0.822** 0.599*** 0.925 0.800**
(0.0689) (0.0729) (0.0609) (0.0808)
PCT GP under 40 0.777*** 0.569*** 0.913 0.765**
(0.0636) (0.0783) (0.0675) (0.0903)
Number of NHS Hospitals ¡
15km (rel to 0)
1 0.501*** 0.343***
(0.0616) (0.0499)
2 0.295*** 0.137***
(0.0432) (0.0261)
3 0.201*** 0.0827***
(0.0320) (0.0206)
4 0.161*** 0.0815***
(0.0332) (0.0227)
5+ 0.0877*** 0.0483***
(0.0160) (0.0122)
Nearest NHS hospital wait
times
1.000 1.003***
(0.000709) (0.00134)
Nearest NHS hospital early
FT
0.816* 0.940
(0.0885) (0.147)
Observations 1,353,213 711,847 1,353,213 711,847 1,353,213 711,847 1,353,213 711,847
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Observations are at the GP-hospital level. The dependent variable
takes the value 1 if the hospital is in the GP’s choice set. Estimates are odds ratios
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